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Historians have struggled with an ingrained perception of what constituted the “tra-
ditional” Quebec family at the beginning of the twentieth century. Early studies on
the demographic history of Quebec portrayed women as generators of large fami-
lies, a practice prescribed by the political elite as well as the Catholic Church. The
new social history, and most especially the recent generation of feminist-inspired
historians, has revisited and criticized the myth of the large family. Aggregated
demographic statistics would indicate that francophone families continued to pro-
duce significantly more children than their English-speaking counterparts well into
the twentieth century, despite a longstanding experience of industrialization, urban-
ization and contraception — the so-called hallmarks of modernization. Yet statistics
also make clear that, even before the onset of declining fertility in the late nineteenth
century, the majority of Quebec families did not do so, and there was in fact wide
variation in family size. The real distinctiveness of Quebec’s fertility decline was its
unique and persistent minority of very large families that disappeared virtually
overnight in the mid-twentieth century when the children of these families chose not
to continue the pattern.
Les historiens luttent contre la perception bien ancrée de ce qu’était la famille
« traditionnelle » du Québec du début du XXe siècle. Les premières études sur l’his-
toire démographique du Québec dépeignaient les femmes comme des engendreuses
de grandes familles, une pratique que prescrivaient tant l’élite politique que l’Église
catholique. La nouvelle histoire sociale et plus particulièrement la génération récente
d’historiens d’inspiration féministe, a revu et critiqué le mythe de la grande famille.
Les statistiques démographiques agrégées donnent à penser que les familles franco-
phones ont continué à faire beaucoup plus d’enfants que les familles anglophones
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pendant une bonne partie du XXe siècle même s’il y avait longtemps que l’industria-
lisation, l’urbanisation et la contraception – qualifiés de piliers de la modernisation
– battaient leur plein autour d’elles. Or, les statistiques montrent aussi clairement
qu’avant même que ne commence à décliner la fécondité à la fin du XIXe siècle, la
majorité des familles du Québec ne faisaient pas tant d’enfants et qu’en fait, la taille
des familles variait beaucoup. Le véritable caractère distinct du déclin de la fécondité
québécoise en a surtout été l’unicité et la persistance des très grosses familles, qui ont
disparu pour ainsi dire du jour au lendemain au milieu du XXe siècle, les enfants de
ces familles ayant alors choisi de ne pas perpétuer la coutume.
THE DECLINE of marital fertility was a massive phenomenon of social
adjustment that swept across the North Atlantic world in the space of three
generations between the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
sheer numbers indicate the profundity of the scale of change: for example, the
average woman marrying in 1860 would probably have had six or seven live
births; three generations later, her grand-daughter, marrying in the 1920s,
would have had two or three. Ansley J. Coale, principal investigator of the
Princeton European Fertility Project, has noted that one key feature of this
transition “is the increased uniformity of fertility” so that “there is little [inter-
nal] variation in the aggregate fertility and mortality of these highly modern-
ized populations”.1 Furthermore, as Susan Cotts Watkins claims, “The timing
of the onset of the transition is ... particularly significant in view of the find-
ings ... that once a 10-percent decline ... occurred, further decline inevitably
followed. ...Curiously, however, even those who could be expected to find
continued childbearing advantageous or family limitation unacceptable
adopted family limitation rather soon after the leaders.”2
The Princeton demographers have done a fine job of describing the trans-
formation of fertility, but, while their large data sets and crude modernization
theories provide us with a great many useful statistical correlations, these are
neither necessary nor sufficient explanations of historical causation. Method-
ologically, the Princeton approach to this subject seems to imply that prov-
inces (registration districts), not couples, had babies. Moreover, by its very
nature, the Princeton approach tends to homogenize experience rather than
considering diversity and variation, which have always characterized human
fertility statistics. Even after decades of intensive study, the fertility decline
remains an enigmatic subject of inquiry.3
1 Ansley J. Coale, “The Decline of Fertility in Europe”, in Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds.,
The Decline of Fertility in Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 29.
2 Susan Cotts Watkins, “Conclusions”, in Coale and Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in Europe,
p. 446.
3 See David Levine, “Moments in Time: An Historian’s Context of Declining Fertility”, in John Gillis,
David Levine, and Louise Tilly, eds., The Quiet Revolution: European History in the Age of Fertility
Decline (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1992).
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In contrast to the generalized and ever-downward rates of fertility in evi-
dence in the European societies studied by the Princeton demographers, the
experience of Quebec women was different: so different, in fact, that one
might consider it unique. According to the multiple studies done on Quebec
fertility, on average, francophone women continued to produce large numbers
of children well into the twentieth century.4 In aggregate, the decline of the
fertility rate in the French-Canadian population does not seem to follow the
usual pattern of demographic transition.5 Researchers have therefore argued
that the theory of demographic transition has been insufficient to explain Que-
bec’s fertility history because aggregated fertility rates remained high during
the transitional generations.
Our central argument is that previous scholars who have studied demo-
graphic data have been misled in assuming that Quebec women, as a group,
were much more fertile than their counterparts in other Canadian provinces
— or even in other countries. This misapprehension arises from the pre-
sumption that completed family sizes in Quebec conformed to a random nor-
mal distribution, whereas, in point of fact, this distribution seems to be bi-
modal. Thus, if one were to ask a sample of mid-twentieth-century Quebec-
ers about the size of their family of origin, roughly half of all respondents
would have said “large” or “more than seven”, yet the vast majority of all
families were in fact small, having three or fewer children. A minority of
families produced almost half of all children born in Quebec during the tran-
sitional generations. For most of the twentieth century in Quebec, then, the
majority of Quebecers conformed to the wider, generalized experience of
smaller family size, but a significant minority maintained extraordinarily
high rates of reproduction into the middle years of the twentieth century.
This minority was significant because, in face of the usual sociological
markers of “modernity” — the lack of available land, industrialization and
urbanization, the advent of mass education, the shift to a more consumer-
driven society, the Catholic Church’s loss of influence on moral values paral-
lelled by a rise in secularization, the increased number of women entering the
work force, increased use of contraception, and the trend towards “quality” as
opposed to “quantity” parenting accompanied by a precipitous decline in
infant mortality rates — this small group of families continued to produce a
large number of children while the majority followed the evolving pattern of
demographic transition.
If the persistence of a minority of super-fertile women in Quebec is some-
thing of an historical mystery, then the overnight disappearance of this sub-
cohort in the third quarter of the twentieth century is an unexamined riddle.
These key problematics must be addressed if we are to gain a full under-
4 Enid Charles, The Changing Size of the Family in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of Trade and Commerce,
1948).
5 Roderic Beaujot, “Les deux transitions démographiques du Québec, 1860–1996”, Cahiers québécois de
démographie, vol. 29 (2000), pp. 201–230.
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standing of francophone Quebec’s peculiar demographic development. In
examining Quebec’s bi-modal fertility dynamics, we also discuss the study
of fertility in Quebec families during the twentieth century.
Fertility Dynamics
Demography is the study of changes in population composition and vital
rates, which combine to identify pivotal transformations in social life. In
addressing the question of fertility, the issue that deserves to be considered
first is: how do people without access to modern contraceptive technology
restrict their numbers? Almost all anthropological investigations reveal a wel-
ter of cultural adaptations to the basic biological fact that human fertility is
never close to its physiological maximum. The demographer’s analytical tool
— “natural fertility” — is, in fact, a heuristic device, which describes cultural
constructions, not biological experiences. According to Henri Leridon,
“[T]he biological maximum for women who remain fecund and exposed to
risk [of pregnancy] from their fifteenth to their forty-fifth birthdays, and who
do not breast-feed their children, would be 17 to 18 children.”6 In point of fact,
Leridon is less than generous in his assessment of what earlier generations
would have called “prolific power” since there is much evidence of heroic
mothers who gave birth to upwards of two dozen children. Of course, in any
population there would also be some women who would be sterile.
In most historical populations that did not practise fertility control — but
rather displayed “natural fertility” characteristics — some women had large
numbers of children and bore them with great regularity while others had
smaller numbers of births spaced further apart and with less regularity. The
distribution of family sizes in “natural fertility” populations was random nor-
mal, by which we mean that, while there was a peak, usually located at the
mean average family size, there was no pronounced concentration around an
agreed-upon family size, a pattern that one would find in contemporary, late-
modern populations that practise fertility control. The historical question that
therefore comes into focus concerns the difference between Leridon’s “bio-
logical maximum” and observed total fertility rates. How low were these pre-
modern fertility rates?
Almost all human societies limit birth rates to some extent. Birth control
patterns change over time. Hunting and gathering societies often limited
births through prolonged lactation in contrast to agricultural societies, in
which fertility was a combination of other strategies: on one hand making sure
enough children were available to work as well as to inherit family land and
possessions, while on the other limiting births to protect resources. Some
societies focus on controlling how closely children are spaced, while others
6 Henri Leridon, Human Fertility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 147; see also F.
Lorimer, Culture and Human Fertility: A Study of the Relation of Cultural Conditions to Fertility in Non-
industrial and Transitional Societies (New York: UNESCO, 1954); John Bongaarts, “Why High Birth
Rates Are So Low”, Population and Development Review, vol. 1 (1975), pp. 289–296.
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(like China or Japan) have historically limited the number of girls who are
born as a method of population control; this, in turn, affects relationships
between boys and girls as well as unbalancing the sex ratio among adults,
making marriage almost universal among the surviving girls but not so fre-
quent among the over-represented males.7 Furthermore, birth-rate limitations
often reflect socio-economic status; the very wealthy in pre-industrial condi-
tions usually had more children than poorer groups because the rich had more
resources to support larger families and survived longer, so that their mar-
riages persisted as “fecund conjugal units”. In today’s Third World, by way of
contrast, the incentive structure is quite different, as rich and middle-class
families restrict fertility and practise a “quality not quantity” strategy,
whereas their poorer neighbours behave in precisely the opposite way.8
A Bi-modal Fertility Pattern
The study of Quebecers’ fertility patterns has had a long history. Population
census enumerations, parish registries, the Tanguay repository, the BALSAC
index in the Saguenay, and more recently interviews, diaries, and autobiog-
raphies have been used in the study of family history. Early demographic
studies were instrumental in identifying the socio-economic and cultural
variables of fertility decline: language, religion, education level, habitat, pro-
fession, and income.9 In examining Quebec’s demographic weight in Can-
ada, demographers have almost always compared the province’s declining
fertility rate to that of other Canadian provinces.
Hubert Charbonneau describes a “demographic revolution” as a process
whereby mortality and natality rates decrease significantly and designates
three key phases to Quebec’s demographic evolution: first, from New France
to about 1875; second, from 1875 to 1930; and third, from 1930 and the late
1960s to early 1970s.10
7 James Lee and Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities,
1700–2000 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). See also T. C. Smith, Nakahara: Fam-
ily Farming and Population in a Japanese Village, 1717–1830 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1977).
8 H. E. Daly, “A Marxian-Malthusian View of Poverty and Development”, Population Studies, vol. 25
(1971), pp. 25–38, and “Marx and Malthus in North-East Brazil: A Note of the World’s Largest Class
Difference in Fertility and its Recent Trends”, Population Studies, vol. 39 (1985), pp. 329–338. See
also J. C. Caldwell, “A Theory of Fertility: From High Plateau to Destabilization”, Population and
Development Review, vol. 4 (1978), pp. 553–577.
9 Danielle Gauvreau and Peter Gossage, “Empêcher la famille : fécondité et contraception au Québec,
1920–1960”, Canadian Historical Review, vol. 78 (1997), pp. 478–510. J. I. Little has used a modified
version of family reconstitution to compare the fertility of a group of Scots-origin women living in the
Eastern Townships with neighbouring French-Canadian women. See J. I. Little, Crofters and Habitants
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991). Similar studies based on census
materials, comparing different ethnic groups in nineteenth-century Montreal, have been undertaken by
Sherry Olson and Patricia Thornton; see, for example, “Shared Spaces/ Partage de l’espace” (McGill
University, Department of Geography Working Paper # 12/1993).
10 Hubert Charbonneau, ed., La population du Québec : études rétrospectives (Montreal: Éditions du
Boréal Express, 1973), pp. 9–15.
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Charbonneau argues that, during the first phase, between 1630 and 1875,
fertility rates remained fairly constant. Over these nine or ten generations, 46
per cent of families had no more than four children, 28 per cent had between
five and eight children, and the remaining 26 per cent had nine children or
more.11 Furthermore, the 11 per cent of mothers who bore more than 12 chil-
dren produced a quarter of all legitimate births. Jacques Henripin reports
that, between 1630 and 1875, “completed families” (that is, married couples
who remained together until the end of the woman’s fertile period) had
between 8.5 and 9 children. The average number for all married couples was
7.2 children.12
With industrialization and urbanization in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, mortality rates and birth rates decreased together, although
Charbonneau argues that, at least in terms of aggregated statistical measures,
Quebecers lagged behind their neighbours in the process of demographic
transition. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century Quebec’s average fertility
rate was beginning to decline: “Par rapport au niveau constant de 7.1 enfants
qui avait été maintenu depuis 1711, les trois périodes de cinq ans qui suivent
1865 sont caractérisées respectivement par les nombres d’enfants suivants :
6.6, 6.7 et 6.8 enfants.”13 Despite this early evidence of a decline from the
historic plateau, 45 per cent of women born between 1886 and 1895, who
would have had a fertile period that began in approximately 1901 and ended
in 1940, would have had more than six children. This represented a decrease
of 25 per cent compared to the generation of women born around 1845.
The especially unique element of Quebec’s fertility history was that the
“super-fertile” couples continued to be a significant element in the popula-
tion. A quarter of the early-twentieth-century families had nine or more
children; these “super-fertile” couples produced half of all live births. A gen-
eration later, 18.5 per cent of married women born between 1911 and 1916 —
whose fertile period took place between 1926 and 1961 — had seven or more
children.14
Charbonneau writes that, during the most recent phase of demographic
transition in the 1960s, Quebecers were losing their demographic “distinc-
tiveness” compared to English Canada; that is, they began to “imitate” their
neighbours’ fertility patterns.15 In point of fact, when he was writing in the
11 This distribution would fit the “random normal” pattern mentioned earlier.
12 Jacques Henripin, Naître ou ne pas être (Quebec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1989),
p. 26. The reader will note that even in “traditional” Quebec, during the reign of “natural fertility”,
almost half of all families (46%) had no more than four children.
13 Jacques Henripin and Yves Péron, “The Demographic Transition in the Province of Quebec”, in Pop-
ulation and Social Change (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 39; Jacques Henripin and Evelyne
Lapierre-Adamcyk, La fin de la revanche des berceaux : qu’en pensent les Québécoises? (Montreal:
Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1974), p. 41.
14 Henripin and Péron, “The Demographic Transition in the Province of Quebec”, p. 39; Henripin and
Lapierre-Adamcyk, La fin de la revanche des berceaux, p. 41.
15 Charbonneau, La population du Québec, p. 15.
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early 1970s, the “super-fertile” minority was vanishing among the pure
laine, vraie/vieille souche Quebecers. In Quebec, there was an unmistakable
convergence around the uni-modal family type that is the common experi-
ence of North Atlantic families during our age of late modernity. Ironically,
Quebec’s silent revolution seems to have stimulated the disappearance of its
most unique institutional arrangement.
Gérard Bouchard and Richard Lalou discuss the concept of “la sur-fécon-
dité” in Quebec since the seventeenth century and compare their results to
those describing English-speaking provinces, the United States, and Europe.
In particular, they suggest that Quebec fertility in the last third of the nine-
teenth century may have been exceptionally high as a result of francophones’
tardiness to use contraceptive methods to limit their number of children in
comparison with the English-speaking populations of North America. How-
ever, the data they review also suggest that many European countries had fer-
tility rates equal to — or greater than — that of Quebec. Bouchard and Lalou
conclude that “the hypothesis of nationalism as a basis of this phenomenon
[high fertility rates] does not appear to be well substantiated”.16 However, it
should be noted that they do not explain the divergent fertility patterns among
francophones within Quebec nor do they consider the perdurance of the super-
fertile minority. This sub-group not only raised the provincial average but also
contributed to the emergence of a pronounced bi-modality in its fertility pro-
file in the period after 1870.
What, then, is a “traditional” Quebec family? Researchers have talked
about it endlessly, but, surprisingly, agreed-upon definitions are not easy to
find. One element in most definitions is that a “traditional” family was rural.
At the turn of the twentieth century, commentators were adamant about the
importance of large Quebec families, traditionally loyal to the land. The key
idea of the myth has been that a “traditional” Quebec family was character-
ized by its piety, its fertility, its morality, its family values, its bond with the
land, its pride in its past, and its concern to preserve its culture. Quebec his-
toriography about the “traditional” Quebec family, circa 1900, presented
these families as an homogeneous group. Most studies on the demographic
history of Quebec portrayed women as generators of large families as pre-
scribed by the political elite, the medical community, and, above all, the
Church.17
The other methodological issue facing us is numerical: what constitutes a
“large” family? This issue is entangled with the belief that the majority of
16 Gérard Bouchard and Richard Lalou, “La sur-fécondité des couples québécois depuis le XVIIe siècle,
essai de mesure et d’interprétation”, Recherches sociographiques, vol. 34 (1993), p. 9.
17 For a recent example of this perspective, see Diane Gervais and Danielle Gauvreau, “Women, Priests,
and Physicians: Family Limitation in Quebec, 1940–1970”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol.
34 (2003), pp. 293–314; the same argument and evidence are presented in French by Danielle Gauvreau
and Diane Gervais, “Les chemins détournés vers une fécondité contrôlée : le cas du Québec, 1930–
1970”, Annales de démographie historique (2002), no. 2, pp. 89–109.
314 Histoire sociale / Social History
families were “super-fertile”. Henripin and his colleagues agglomerate fami-
lies of five or more children to analyse women’s desire for children in the
context of the declining fertility rate.18 In contrast, women interviewed by
Denise Lemieux and Leon Bernier believed that a family of five children was
“large”.19 Raising the stakes, Gérard Bouchard uses a benchmark of seven
children.20 With an unclear definition of what constitutes a “large” or even a
“traditional” Quebec family, the reconstruction of past fertility practices
inevitably creates some crucial misunderstandings concerning the dynamics
of family life — and the particular contours of its declining fertility over
time.
The perceived “super-fertile” majority was, in fact, a minority. Moreover,
it appears that the Quebec family, circa 1900, was more varied than the sec-
ondary literature has led us to believe. Revisionist studies, especially those
based on personal histories, stress the multiplicity of fertility experiences
and the divergence of the majority from the supposed tradition of “super-fer-
tility”. Marie Lavigne, the first to be concerned with this issue, points out
that the use of averages to describe fertility is misleading; she makes this
novel distinction but concentrates her attention on those women who had
few or no children, either in or out of wedlock.21 Studies of multiple experi-
ences of childbearing focus on groups that have been perceived as marginal
— families with a small number of children, which did not follow the pre-
scriptions of the Church. While these studies are accurate in some respects,
there is a distinct need to identify different sub-groups of families to deter-
mine why a significant minority of families were prolific well into the 1960s
while most were not.
The historiography on the Quebec family needs to be revisited to describe
and explain more fully the compositional differences among its sub-groups.
18 Jacques Henripin et al., Les enfants qu’on n’a plus au Québec (Montreal: Presses de l’Université de
Montréal, 1981).
19 Denise Lemieux and Leon Bernier, “La transmission intergénérationnelle dans les projets de
procréation : une approche qualitative et subjective des changements démographiques au Québec”,
International Journal of Canadian Studies (1993), special issue, pp. 85–103. This contrast between the
findings of Henripin and those of Lemieux and Bernier is more apparent than real since asking women
about “large” families produces a different kind of answer than asking children about the size of their
sibling group.
20 Gérard Bouchard, Quelques arpents d’Amérique : population, économie, famille au Saguenay,1838–
1971 (Montreal: Éditions du Boréal, 1996).
21 Marie Lavigne, “Réflexions féministes autour de la fertilité québécoise”, in Nadia Fahmy-Eid and
Micheline Dumont, eds., Maîtresses de maison, maîtresses d’école : femmes, famille et éducation
dans l’histoire du Québec (Montreal: Éditions du Boréal, 1983), pp. 319–338. In our concern with
what we might call “the tyranny of averages”, we are indeed on the same wavelength as Lavigne, but
we draw quite different conclusions about how we can understand the distribution of family sizes
among francophone Québécoises. We do not claim that we are “correct” and that Lavigne is “wrong”,
nor do we dispute her claim that quite a few women were permanently celibate and that some married
women had fewer than the average number of children. Rather, we are concerned to make clear that
this is only part of the story.
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This need is pressing because so much of the scholarly literature has been
devoted to the analysis of aggregates and averages. Indeed, in aggregate, the
decline of the fertility rate in the French-Canadian population does not follow
a traditional pattern of demographic transition. However, when applied to the
majority of the population — thereby excluding the “super-fertile” minority
that produced large family sizes into the second half of the twentieth century
— the pattern of declining fertility rates and smaller completed family sizes
among francophone Quebecers resembles those of surrounding populations
that adhered to the well-known pattern of demographic transition.
It has been argued that the theory of demographic transition is insufficient
to explain Quebec’s demographic history because fertility rates continued to
remain high while the usual factors held to be responsible for the decline in
fertility rates — such as secularization, urbanization, industrialization, and
declining levels of mortality — were very much in evidence. Dis-aggregat-
ing the sub-cultures of fertility provides a more refined vision of family for-
mation practices. Attending to the demographic variations among the vraie/
vieille souche, pure laine Quebecers avoids the interpretive muddle that
arises from a slavish following of the theory of demographic transition.
Demographic Variations
The period from 1870 to 1960 falls between the “first fertility decline” and
the more recent one dominated by the radical change in Quebec’s demo-
graphic characteristics in the late-modern age of safe, reliable, affordable,
and accessible birth control. Jacques Henripin relied on the 1961 census,
which he argues provides more detailed information about income, internal
migration, and fertility than earlier enumerations.22 Between 1851 and 1951
the fertility rate in Quebec gradually decreased by 40.3 per cent, but demo-
graphic research also suggests that Quebec did not consistently have the
highest fertility rate among Canadian provinces. In fact, prior to 1881,
Ontario’s fertility rate was higher than that of Quebec.23 Only between 1921
and 1951 was the fertility rate in Quebec higher than that of any other prov-
ince in Canada (excluding recently settled Saskatchewan and Manitoba).
Figure 1 also illustrates that, during the period reviewed, national fertility
rates steadily decreased and underwent a marked decline between 1921 and
1941; this was followed by a post-war baby boom across all parts of Canada
and, finally, a further decline as the baby boom waned and the era of reliable
22 Jacques Henripin, Tendances et facteurs de la fécondité au Canada (Ottawa: Bureau fédéral de la
statistique, 1968), p. iii.
23 No doubt this higher aggregated fertility level in mid-Victorian Ontario needs to be more finely
analysed to take into account the essential fact that migration into Ontario of people of childbearing
age was much greater than migration into Quebec. Only Montreal received any substantial number of
non-native-born outsiders; most other parts of Quebec reflected deeper, province-wide age distribu-
tions, and, indeed, many parts of Quebec were actually exporting people of childbearing age to the
cities of the province and also to New England.
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contraception emerged with the introduction and dissemination of the estro-
gen pill. It is germane to point out that the shapes of the three fertility curves
— national, Quebec, and Ontario — are essentially similar although these
aggregated statistics do suggest that Quebec lagged behind other parts of
Canada in its long-term fertility decline.
Henripin and Péron’s analysis of these rates resulted in the following state-
ment: “Le maintien d’un taux de fécondité aussi élevé est surtout dû aux
Canadiens français du Québec pour lesquels la dimension des familles a ma-
nifesté une résistance remarquable à la diminution de la fécondité observée
dans tous les pays industrialisés.”24 Ironically, as these commentators were
doing their research and writing up their results, epochal changes were occur-
ring in the fertility habits “inside the bedrooms of the nation”.
Henripin and Péron refer to average fertility rates and report that between
1871 and 1961 Quebec’s fertility decline was much slower than that of
Ontario. Their aggregated data, illustrated in Table 1, do indeed suggest that
Quebec’s fertility rate was consistently higher and remained so longer when
compared with that of Ontario. But these aggregated data obscure at least as
much as they reveal.
In the early 1970s demographic historians began to use interviews in an
attempt to gather additional information to explain the reasons behind the
decisions couples were making with regard to the number of children they
would have. The onset of dramatically declining fertility in the 1960s —
itself a reflection of the overnight disappearance of la sur-fécondité of the
24 Jacques Henripin and Yves Péron, “La transition démographique au Québec”, in Charbonneau, ed.,
La population du Québec, p. 39.
Figure 1 Examples of Fertility Rates in Canada. Henripin, Tendances et facteurs de la 
fécondité, p. 21.
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minority and the “echo” after the “baby boom” among the rest — was a key
factor that led Henripin and Lapierre-Adamcyk to provide recommendations
for a “politique de la natalité” to counterbalance the contemporary percep-
tions of recent, precipitous declines in Quebec’s fertility rate. Henripin and
Lapierre-Adamcyk’s study, titled La fin de la revanche des berceaux, was
based on interviews conducted in 1971 with a group of 1,745 women
between the ages of 15 and 65 about their reproductive behaviour and their
desire to have children. The authors were attempting to describe a recent
change in Quebec’s demographic history that boded ill for the future — the
“abysmal” birth rates. In a subsequent study, part of the first group inter-
viewed in 1971 by Henripin and Lapierre-Adamcyk was contacted again to
re-assess participants’ decisions surrounding their choice to limit the size of
their families.25 As a result of this second study, the authors developed a table
to illustrate the distribution of the number of children married women born
between 1920 and 1950 had or were estimated to have. Figure 2 was created
using part of the information contained in the table developed by Henripin
and Lapierre-Adamcyk.
These data make clear that, prior to the generation born between 1936 and
1940, the percentage distribution of family sizes was stable. The slow rise in
the likelihood that women would have two or three children then became
more pronounced, while, contrarily, there was a very substantial drop in the
group of women bearing five or more children. Among women born after
1946, the very large family (five children or more) essentially vanished,
while the proportion of this cohort who would have had just two children
nearly doubled. What these data reveal so strikingly is the late-twentieth-
century convergence around the uni-modal family type that is the common
experience of late modernity.
25 Henripin et al., Les enfants qu’on n’a plus au Québec.
Table 1 Decline in Fertility, Quebec and Ontario
Time Province Province
period of Quebec of Ontario
1871–1891 – 11% – 27%
1891–1911 – 4% – 14%
1911–1921 – 1% – 20%
1921–1931 – 16% – 17%
1931–1941 – 11% – 20%
1941–1951 – 7%  13%
1951–1961 – 11% 0.07%
Source: Henripin and Péron, “La transition 
démographique au Québec”, p. 39.
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In his recent study La fin de la famille moderne, Daniel Dagenais exam-
ines declining fertility rates to argue that they reflected a change in the cul-
ture of family life from an “objective” fertility control (control by the
institution of marriage) as opposed to a more “subjective” fertility control
(cultural control stemming from the diffusion of middle-class values — what
he calls “la société bourgeoise”). Dagenais creates an interesting table, simi-
lar to the one Henripin and his colleagues derived from their interview popu-
lation. Dagenais uses data drawn from the Canadian census and the Bureau
de la Statistique du Québec to distribute married women with legitimate
children according to their generation of birth and the number of children
they had borne. This table is reproduced here as Table 2.
Although his statistical results are relevant in the context of this discus-
sion, Dagenais is more concerned with explaining when the change in family
structure, limiting family size to two or three children, occurred for the
majority of families in order to argue how the nature of the relationship
between parents and children evolved. In the context of parents’ new “rap-
port” with their children or the place children came to occupy in the family
unit, Dagenais chooses to address the emerging problem of below-replace-
ment fertility and the redefinition of the parents’ role by stressing the impact
of the “emancipation of the individual”, which he considers to be character-
istic of a late-modern society, in which childbearing and child raising are no
longer seen as the primary purpose of marriage. Dagenais’s monograph is
not concerned with explaining why a substantial minority of Quebec women
Figure 2 Percentage Distribution of the Number of Children per Married Woman Accord-
ing to their Date of Birth. Henripin et al., Les enfants qu’on n’a plus au Québec, 
p. 32.
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Table 2 Percentage Distribution of Family Size per Generation and the Mother’s Prov-
ince of Origin
Number of children per woman as a percentage
Average no.
Generation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+ of children
1877
Quebec 22.8 5.7 6.0 6.2 6.1 6.1 41.4 5.60
Ontario 24.2 11.2 12.8 11.5 9.9 6.8 21.7 3.50
1877–1886
Quebec 23.1 6.8 7.1 6.9 6.6 6.2 43.2 5.40
Ontario 25.8 13.7 15.1 12.6 9.9 6.7 16.0 3.00
1887–1896
Quebec 23.9 7.9 8.3 7.7 6.9 6.2 38.7 4.90
Ontario 25.6 15.2 17.3 13.5 9.3 6.2 12.5 2.80
1897–1901
Quebec 27.8 8.7 9.4 8.8 7.3 6.4 31.1 3.79
Ontario 23.9 15.4 19.1 14.1 9.3 6.0 11.7 2.47
1902–1906
Quebec 29.9 10.0 11.5 9.3 7.8 6.2 24.0 3.40
Ontario 24.8 16.3 20.2 14.2 8.8 5.4 9.9 2.39
1907–1911
Quebec 30.0 10.9 13.1 10.4 7.9 6.1 21.2 3.17
Ontario 23.9 17.2 22.9 14.1 8.3 5.0 8.4 2.34
1912–1916
Quebec 26.8 10.4 13.5 11.7 9.2 7.0 21.3 3.12
Ontario 20.9 16.1 23.7 16.3 9.4 5.1 8.1 2.42
1917–1921
Quebec 22.4 18.5 14.6 13.1 10.5 7.9 21.7 3.28
Ontario 17.7 14.1 24.0 17.9 10.9 6.1 9.0 2.59
1922–1926
Quebec 19.4 8.7 15.0 14.7 12.2 8.9 21.1 3.35
Ontario 13.5 11.7 23.5 19.9 13.0 7.3 11.0 2.76
1927–1931
Quebec 17.6 9.1 16.5 16.3 14.1 9.3 17.2 3.29
Ontario 12.2 10.0 23.0 21.2 14.3 8.1 11.2 2.96
1932–1936
Quebec 16.2 19.3 20.3 19.7 14.1 8.6 11.9 2.98
Ontario 10.6 9.3 23.9 23.4 15.5 8.1 9.3 2.92
1937–1941
Quebec 15.3 11.6 27.7 22.4 11.9 5.8 5.4 2.29
Ontario 11.2 10.1 29.1 25.1 13.2 6.0 5.3 2.63
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persisted in producing very large families into the middle years of the twen-
tieth century. It would be farfetched to argue that this minority persisted in
“objectively” producing large numbers of children because of its adherence
to “l’institution matrimoniale” while the majority had already moved toward
what he describes as a “modern family structure” consistent with the estab-
lishment of “middle-class values”. Dagenais’s argument about the adoption
of “la société bourgeoise” therefore seems contradictory because it fails to
address the key issue concerning the persistence of large families through
the middle decades of the twentieth century. His history of cultural change in
relation to family dynamics seems to us to beg the crucial question rather
than answer it.
Danielle Gauvreau and Peter Gossage analyse fertility and contraception
between 1920 and 1960 with the use of interviews and data published in
Henripin and Lapierre-Adamcyk’s La fin de la revanche des berceaux.26
Gauvreau and Gossage’s study confirms that aggregated fertility rates had
already begun to decrease by the late nineteenth century and that this slow
decline continued through the mid-twentieth century, although the post-war
26 Gauvreau and Gossage, “Empêcher la famille”.
Table 2 (Concluded)
Number of children per woman as a percentage
Average no.
Generation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+ of children
1942–1946
Quebec 16.5 15.0 35.5 20.6 7.9 2.7 1.8 2.05
Ontario 13.2 12.2 37.4 23.3 8.9 2.9 2.0 2.21
1947–1951
Quebec 18.4 17.1 39.5 18.3 4.8 1.2 0.6 1.81
Ontario 15.5 14.1 41.2 20.5 6.2 1.6 0.8 1.97
1952–1956
Quebec 21.8 19.1 38.8 15.9 3.4 0.7 0.4 1.64
Ontario 19.5 15.4 39.0 19.2 5.1 1.1 0.6 1.81
1957–1961
Quebec 26.7 22.8 34.4 13.3 2.3 0.4 0.2 1.44
Ontario 26.8 19.9 33.3 15.4 3.5 0.7 0.3 1.52
1962–1966
Quebec 37.6 28.5 24.8 7.8 1.0 0.1 0.1 1.07
Ontario 40.0 26.2 23.6 8.4 1.4 0.2 0.1 1.07
Source: Dagenais, La fin de la famille moderne.
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“baby-boom” provided a slight reprieve before the final period of definitive
decline and convergence took place during the 1960s. The approach taken
by Gauvreau and Gossage (as many other researchers have done) is to use
aggregates to explain fertility patterns in Quebec history. To be sure, they
separate the population according to linguistic and “ethnic” categories, but
within each of these subsets their analysis is based on mean averages. The
fine points of the distribution’s shape are essentially ignored. Such an ana-
lytical strategy makes sense in most circumstances when the distribution
conforms to a random normal pattern, but, crucially, the distribution of fam-
ily sizes in Quebec did not do so. Rather, it conformed to a bi-modal pattern
in which so-called “out-liers” contributed about one-half of all children born
to members of that sub-population.
Demographic transition theory can be employed to account for the major-
ity of Quebec families which conformed to the expectations of the theory,
even while a minority would have continued to have large families. The chil-
dren of these fewer, but much larger, families raise the average so greatly
that the aggregated data have led commentators to assume, mistakenly, that
the demographic transition theory is not relevant to the demographic dynam-
ics of the francophone population of Quebec. The key point is that the expe-
rience of this “super-fertile” sub-group, comprising approximately 15 to 20
per cent of families, not only contradicts the expectations of demographic
transition theory but also inflates the mean average to such an extent that it
does not accurately reflect the behaviour of the majority. In describing
roughly one in five families as “anomalous” (or “out-liers”), we are stretch-
ing that concept, since this minority is perhaps more accurately a counter-
culture of fertility that needs to be understood in its own terms.
Interpretations of Quebec Demography
The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of
the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves
and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such
periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past
to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in
order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honored disguise
and this borrowed language.27
The analysis of Quebec’s demographic history has almost always been inter-
penetrated with political issues, especially insofar as it has been conducted
in terms of the representation of French Canadians in comparison with the
rest of Canada. For example, Charbonneau’s 1973 collection of essays put
27 Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, in Lewis Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels:
Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 320.
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great emphasis on the fact that French Canadians had been the dominant
socio-cultural group within the Canadian population until the middle of the
twentieth century.
In the third quarter of the twentieth century, it became apparent that the
rapidly declining fertility of Quebec francophones — and in particular the
end of the regime of bi-modality — engendered fears for the social and cul-
tural future of Quebec. What had heretofore been a backburner issue went to
the top of the political agenda, and recommendations were made to promote
fertility to counteract its decline. Of course, the issue of language rights and
the designation of linguistic paternity became critical topics, nowhere more
so than in Montreal, where it appeared that francophones were heading
towards a minority position, first in schools and later (and inevitably) in the
general population.
A few years earlier in 1968, Jacques Henripin sparked this public debate
by relating the particularities of the plummeting fertility rate to the evolving
constitutional position of Quebec’s francophones in Canada as follows:
Au Canada, l’examen des conséquences possibles des variations de la fécon-
dité ne saurait passer sous silence un aspect majeur de la vie politique du pays :
la concurrence linguistique. Elle se livre sur bien des plans, on ne saurait nier
que l’un des éléments les plus importants de cette concurrence est la course
démographique. Depuis trois quarts de siècle, un équilibre s’est maintenu :
presque toute l’immigration a contribué à grossir les effectifs des anglophones,
mais cela était compensé par la surfécondité des francophones. Cependant,
depuis une quarantaine d’années, cette surfécondité s’amenuise et il est à peu
près certain qu’elle ne suffit plus à assurer la compensation de l’immigration,
[...] La fécondité devient ainsi l’objet d’interventions d’ordre politique; il n’est
pas exclu qu’elle soit un jour l’objet d’interventions de la part des pouvoirs
publics.28
In their study published in Charbonneau’s 1973 collection, Jacques Henripin
and Yves Péron did not explore the reasons behind this “high” fertility level,
but they did propose the following:
Peut-être la plupart des familles canadiennes-françaises n’ont-elles tout sim-
plement pas eu les connaissances nécessaires pour limiter la dimension de leur
famille plus tôt. L’obédience à la doctrine catholique a probablement été un
instrument important dans cette absence de connaissances; elle l’a sûrement
été pour ce qui concerne l’abstention de l’usage des moyens contraceptifs.
Peut-être nulle part dans le monde, l’idéal catholique d’une nombreuse famille
28 Henripin, Tendances et facteurs de la fécondité au Canada, p. xxviii. In this quotation, the phrase la
surfécondité des francophones refers to aggregated levels of fertility, not the kind of “super fertility”
that we discuss here.
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a-t-il été observé avec plus d’efficacité. Cet idéal fut renforcé par une propa-
gande nationaliste vigoureuse en faveur de la revanche des berceaux et l’on
peut difficilement douter du succès de ces idées.29
It is worthwhile pausing to consider this analysis because it highlights a
common misinterpretation of Quebec’s demographic evolution. Henripin
and Péron begin by stating that the majority (“la plupart”) of francophone
families did not have the knowledge (“les connaissances nécessaires”) to
limit the size of their families. Yet, as the statistics noted previously make
abundantly clear, whether we are considering the situation in 1900 or 1968,
the majority of the francophone population was, in fact, doing just that.
While Henripin and Péron claim that pious obedience to Catholic preaching
was crucial, an equally credible argument can be advanced that, in the face
of repeated and vociferous attempts by clerics to influence the population’s
demographic behaviour, the majority was behaving in precisely the opposite
manner.30 Thirdly, Henripin and Péron suggest that nowhere else in the
world was the Catholic ideal of large families being observed as effectively
as in Quebec.31 Our discussion of the demographic statistics makes clear,
however, that only a minority of francophone families in Quebec were
“super-fertile”. Finally, they claim that Quebec nationalism — and espe-
cially the call to increase Quebec’s political profile through “la revanche des
berceaux” — was undoubtedly behind the resistance of previous generations
of Quebecers to the siren’s call of fertility control. This final point is espe-
cially interesting because, yet again, it is widely asserted — but never dem-
onstrated — that obedience to their secular leaders’ admonishments was the
reason for the persistence of this super-fertile sub-group for several genera-
tions while most of their contemporaries were acting privately to limit their
fertility. In this instance, the power of discourse has overwhelmed the statis-
tical reality of which Henripin and Péron would have been well aware, since
they spent their academic careers working with fertility data. The image of
the large, “traditional” family was more powerful than the concrete demo-
graphic realities that were amply documented in studies of Quebec’s fertility.
One exceptional scholar tried to show that the emperor of la surfécondité
had no clothes. Philippe Garigue questioned the theories of some of the
major, turn-of-the-century historians and sociologists whose work was, he
suggests, tantamount to political and ecclesiastic discourse. In this regard, he
refers to Falardeau’s argument about Quebec society, in part, as follows: “La
culture canadienne-française traditionnelle est sociologiquement inadéquate
et est destinée à disparaître pour la bonne raison qu’elle ne peut préparer les
29 Henripin and Péron, “La transition démographique au Québec”, pp. 41–42.
30 This criticism is relevant to the recent publications of Gauvreau and Gervais (“Women, Priests and
Physicians” and “Les chemins détournés”).
31 This statement is simply hyperbolic; see, by way of contrast, Daly, “A Marxian-Malthusian View of
Poverty and Development” and “Marx and Malthus in North-East Brazil”.
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Canadiens français à faire face aux exigences d’une vie urbaine indus-
trielle.”32 However, Garigue seems to have been a voice in the academic wil-
derness. Our survey of scholarly literature suggests that Garigue’s work was
almost entirely ignored in other publications on the subject of fertility
decline — his essay was referred to in one article in 1966,33 but not again
until 1989,34 after which he is cited more frequently.35 Garigue played the
devil’s advocate, challenging the established academic literature of the
social organization of Quebec written by the Chicago School. He clearly
states: “Il ne s’agit pas seulement de montrer le caractère mythique ou
idéologique de certaines idées courantes sur le Canada français, mais aussi
celui de certaines déclarations faites par plusieurs chercheurs en sciences
sociales, notamment les américains Redfield, Miner et Hughes.”36
Not only was Garigue’s criticism ignored, but the peculiar appropriation
of the Chicago School’s sociology of Quebec continued to flourish in discus-
sions of Quebecers’ demographic behaviour during the final stages of the
transition to lower, controlled fertility. This discursive image of the large,
“traditional” family was at the heart of the demo-linguistic debate that raged
in the 1960s and 1970s. Most contributors to this debate did not possess sta-
tistical or demographic training as did Henripin and Péron, although, as
already noted, such training did not render them impervious to the lure of the
discursive myth of the supposedly “traditional” family among Quebecers. To
make sense of the power of this myth, we need to locate it within the politics
of language/culture that was a crucial element in the emergence of a feder-
ated Canadian state in the third quarter of the nineteenth century.
Bruce Curtis’s narrative of the evolution in census-making in mid-nine-
teenth-century Canada draws our attention to the social construction of both
population and statistics. Neither was a neutral category that could be filled
with “evidence” supplied by impartial enumerators. Rather, the whole pro-
cess was embedded in the state formation activities of the Canadian political
economy. Census-taking was an exercise in surveillance, but, to a rather
32 Philippe Garigue, “Réexamen de l’évolution sociale du Québec”, in M. Rioux and Y. Martin, eds., La
société canadienne-française (Montreal: Hurtubise HMH, 1971), p. 154. This article was first pub-
lished in English in 1960 in the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. Quote taken
from J. C. Falardeau, Essais sur le Québec contemporain (Quebec: Presses universitaires Laval,
1953), p. 8.
33 M.-A. Tremblay, “Modèles d’autorité dans la famille canadienne-française”, Recherches sociographi-
ques, vol. 7 (1966), pp. 215–230.
34 Denise Lemieux and Lucie Mercier, “Familles et destins féminins : le prisme de la mémoire, 1880–
1940”, Recherches sociographiques, vol. 28 (1987), pp. 255–271.
35 An indication of Garique’s invisible status is that, in a survey of twentieth-century Quebec historiog-
raphy, Ronald Rudin never mentions Garigue, nor does he cite Garigue’s work in his bibliography.
See Ronald Rudin, Making History in Twentieth Century Quebec (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1997).
36 Philippe Garigue, Études sur le Canada français (Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal,
1958), p. 6.
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larger extent, it was also an exercise in the normalization of social relations,
creating everyday and accepted categories into which “the population” could
be organized. The modern liberal state’s ideological programme of self-rep-
resentation was echoed in shuffling the deck of social relations. In a thor-
oughly Canadian way, language issues took precedence as a result of J.-C.
Taché’s successful attempts to manipulate the data in a fashion most favour-
able for the francophone population. Taché’s construction of “the popula-
tion” was part of the price that the Macdonald/Cartier coalition was willing
to pay to bring the new nation’s first, post-Confederation enumeration into
line with newly emerging international standards of social-scientific, statisti-
cal, information-gathering standards.37
Taché’s project succeeded brilliantly since it was not until the latter
decades of the twentieth century that these categories — of patriarchy, at any
rate — were brought into question by Canadians. It is more than a little
ironic that a francophone intellectual like J.-C. Taché, whose primary socio-
political concern was with the St-Jean-Baptiste Society’s quest, À l’Avenir
de la Patrie, and whose primary means of ensuring la survivance was to
encourage rural society by fashioning a canadien cultural memory through
popular literature, would usher the era of rational numerical calculation into
Canadian history. Taché was a schoolmate and comrade of Cyprien Tanguay,
who has been the historical personage credited with bringing the politics of
population in line with the developing cultural imaginary that paid particular
attention to the myth of la revanche des berceaux. This mythical politics of
hyper-fecundity was first created in the late nineteenth century, then propa-
gated until it took on its own discursive life. In so doing, it became influen-
tial in giving a peculiar inflection to the twentieth-century discourse on
language, culture, and population in Quebec — and also, of course, in rela-
tion to la francophonie as well as Quebec-in-Canada.
By the turn of the twentieth century, a political, medical, and ecclesiastic
discourse took form in reaction to declining fertility rates, high mortality
rates (of both mother and child), increased immigration by non-franco-
phones, rural migration to Montreal as well as to Quebec’s smaller cities,
out-migration beyond the borders of Quebec, industrialization, and capitalist
enterprise. By the time the Great Depression hit, the concept of the tradi-
tional Quebec family was fully developed as a key component of the multi-
stranded discourse relating to language, culture, and provincial rights.38 The
growing anxiety of Quebec nationalists was anchored in the repetitive re-
hashing of the myth of the “traditional” Quebec family.
37 Bruce Curtis, The Politics of Population: State Formation, Statistics and the Census of Canada,
1840–1875 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 286.
38 From Ronald Rudin’s discussion of the influence of Lionel Groulx, it seems clear that there was an
inverse correlation between the marginalization of francophone Quebecers from the commanding
heights of the provincial economy and Groulx’s glorification of “tradition” as a means of coping with
downward mobility. See Rudin, Making History, especially pp. 103–104.
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The Chicago School of scholars of rural sociology was instrumental in
modernizing the inheritance from nineteenth-century, French-Canadian cul-
tural nationalists like Tanguay by developing the concept of a “folk society”
to describe Quebec. This collection of scholars comprised prominent sociol-
ogists and historians, Americans and Quebecers: Hughes and Miner, Gérin,
Falardeau, and Rioux being the foremost among them. Their interpretation
of the “folk society” they observed in Quebec was crucial to the discourse
shaping their contemporaries’ beliefs about “traditional” Quebec culture.
The Chicago School strongly believed that a clash existed between rural
and urban environments and that industrialization and urbanization would
mean the disappearance of the Quebec culture. This “folk society” was
unlikely to adapt itself to social change because of its deep grounding in tra-
dition. Ironically, the Chicago School’s interpretive framework was itself
appropriated from nineteenth-century Quebec cultural nationalists. In 1898
Léon Gérin published L’habitant de St-Justin, in which he described a “typi-
cal”, “traditional” Quebec family with strong ties to the land. Gérin’s 1937
book Le type économique et social des Canadiens likewise describes a “typ-
ical”, “traditional” Quebec family. E. C. Hughes, one of the most prominent
Chicago School social scientists of the 1930s and 1940s, wrote approvingly of
Gérin’s description of the Quebec society not just because it “represents the
ideal rural life of which French-Canadian leaders and poets speak”, but also
because it was “a reality for a good part of rural Quebec”. Philippe Garigue
revisited Gérin’s study and concluded:
The argument that French Canada is essentially rural in character has been so
extensively repeated that it has become a “myth” supporting numberless asser-
tations. It was used during the depression to support a movement “back to the
land”. It has also served as reinforcement to the teachings of social reformers
who saw in the idealised life of rural Quebec the true state of nature where
everything was at its best. It explains why a sociologist could write in an
unguarded moment “the industrial revolution in Quebec abruptly disturbed a
pastoral symphony”.39
The most important representative of the Chicago School was Horace
Miner, who in 1939 suggested that contemporary Quebecers lived with an
ideal of a simple rural society that caused a deep cultural conflict between
rural and urban areas: “Miner, for instance, was one of the earliest to argue
that there was such a conflict [rural/urban], attributed it to the fact that the
local social organisation was basically that of the seventeenth century, com-
parable to that of a ‘folk’ society isolated and without much money econ-
39 Philippe Garigue, “St Justin: A Case Study in Rural French-Canadian Social Organization”, Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 22 (1956), p. 318. Hughes’s approval of Gérin’s
description of St-Justin is quoted by Garigue on p. 302 of this article.
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omy, and one which, according to him, had remained unchanged for two
centuries.”40 Miner believed that rural Quebec in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century was comparable in its modes of social organization
to the pioneering society of the seventeenth century. In his fieldwork, Miner
described the first few years of a couple’s marriage in Saint-Denis-de-
Kamouraska to stress the commonness of large families and Quebecers’
attachment to their simple rural society as the cause of a deep cultural con-
flict between rural and urban areas.
The Chicago School scholars seem to have understood the mythical pro-
portions taken by their views on Quebec culture, but they found ways to ratio-
nalize them. The Chicago School built a myth of the “traditional” family that
could not be sustained in the conditions of social, economic, and cultural evo-
lution that were taking place within the very “folk society” they were describ-
ing. The key point is that this fabrication was sustained in the face of facts on
the ground — demographic “facts” as well as economic, geographical, cul-
tural, and social “facts”. Or, as Marx suggested, “[J]ust when they seem
engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something that
has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they
anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service....”
Countering Gérin’s and Miner’s position, Garigue argued that Quebec
society was — and had been since New France — “mainly commercial and
urban”. Garigue’s arguments were nothing less than revolutionary but do not
appear to have been well received by his contemporaries. Scholarly publica-
tions continued to emphasize the unease with which nationalist, francophone
Quebecers viewed modernization, and especially the inevitable change in
family structures and decreasing fertility rates associated with it. For exam-
ple, Odoric Bouffard examined Quebec literature to highlight the disappear-
ance of the traditional Quebec family.41 In much the same way, Maurice
Lemire analysed Gabrille Roy’s Bonheur d’occasion in the context of tradi-
tional Quebec families struggling to survive in an increasingly Anglo-Saxon,
urban environment plagued by poverty.42 In 1972 René Jutras stated that the
decline in “fecundity” since the 1960s was a clear indication of the state of
the social climate in the province and that the State should examine the situ-
ation and provide solutions to enhance the importance of fertile families. It is
salient to note that Jutras shared the same fears as the followers of Chicago
School folk sociology in arguing that the double effect of industrialization
and urbanization had had a negative impact on birth rates.43 Through their
articles on Quebec society and culture, the nationalists focused attention on
40 Garigue, “St Justin: A Case Study”, p. 326. The work by Everett C. Hughes to which Garigue refers is
French Canada in Transition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943).
41 Odoric Bouffard, “Le Canadien-français entre deux mondes”, Culture, vol. 28 (1967), pp. 347–356.
42 Maurice Lemire, “Bonheur d’occasion ou le salut par la guerre”, Recherches sociographiques, vol. 10
(1969), pp. 23–35.
43 René Jutras, “Viabilité de la famille québécoise”, L’action nationale, vol. 61 (1972), pp. 357–383.
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what they thought were recent changes in the organization of the “traditional
family” to urge the State (the provincial government of Quebec) to provide
means to generate more children in an effort to preserve the strength of Que-
becers in Canada.
Many demographic studies published from the 1960s to the late 1980s were
used to support the nationalist political agenda and, especially, to promote
programmes that would raise Quebec’s fertility rate so that the “Quebec
nation” could keep its place as a distinct culture in Canada. There was a fear
that the influence of francophone Canadians would rapidly lose constitutional
status as a founding people because the Quebec provincial government had
proved itself to be incapable of counteracting this relative loss in numbers.
Charbonneau expresses this concern, central to the nationalist movement,
which was explored extensively in Quebec’s demographic research: “Après
avoir profité, puis espéré de la puissance du nombre, le Québec s’est orientée,
délibérément ou non, vers le développement qualitatif de ses ressources
humaines.”44 Once again, however, the problematic was mis-stated: the issue
was not that fertility rates had decreased radically because families now chose
to go for “quality” as opposed to “quantity”; the majority of Quebec’s franco-
phone families had been doing precisely that for several generations. The
problem facing nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s was that the exceptional
pattern of bi-modal fertility dynamics was disappearing in front of their eyes.
Their ideologically and discursively blinkered vision prevented them from
seeing this change for what it was — the disappearance of a super-fertile
minority — but rather suggested that, somehow, this was a crisis in reproduc-
tion that afflicted the whole francophone population.
The concept of the traditional Quebec family as portrayed in Lemire was
an important tool in the political and ecclesiastic discourse for most of half
of the twentieth century.45 Peter Gossage and Danielle Gauvreau analysed
the public discourse of the early twentieth century, which concerned itself
with the first phase of declining fertility rates among Quebecers:
While such trends [declining fertility rates] certainly contributed to the grow-
ing anxiety of conservative nationalists in turn-of-the-century Quebec, these
fears were based as much on social and political ideology as on any detailed
demographic analysis. As we shall see, World War I represented a significant
turning point in this debate, a point at which the essentially political question
of numbers took on a new urgency and when the once triumphant nationalist
rhetoric around fertility began to take on a note of preventive exhortation.46
44 Charbonneau, La population du Québec, p. 5.
45 Most, if not all, of the articles published in the scholarly journal L’action nationale were political in
nature. Through their articles on Quebec society and culture, the nationalists were able to find support
for their design and method to their purpose.
46 Peter Gossage and Danielle Gauvreau, “Demography and Discourse in Transition: Quebec Fertility at
the Turn of the Twentieth Century”, History of the Family, vol. 4, no. 4 (1999), pp. 379–380.
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Gossage and Gauvreau’s conclusion is applicable in describing the state of
historical and demographic research on the question of declining fertility
among Quebecers that persisted until the 1990s. The research we reviewed
suggests that Quebec historiography has shied away from non-traditional or
revisionist approaches to its population history.
In the past 30 years, an astonishing amount of research has been con-
ducted by statisticians and demographers located at the Université de Mon-
tréal’s department of demography with respect to the declining fertility rate
and the future of French language and Quebec in Canada. These studies
were often prescriptive in nature; that is, they tried to devise strategies to
promote births among Quebec families. René Jutras, describing the implica-
tions of this academic research into declining fertility for the benefit of his
nationalist readers in L’Action nationale, wrote that “the nation” was an
extension of the family and that la famille québécoise was now in crisis
because it was failing to reproduce itself. According to Jutras, it was thus
necessary to make recommendations to governments for its preservation:
Il n’y a aucune nation présentement qui voudrait risquer de se dispenser de la
société familiale pour assurer non seulement la transmission de la culture
nationale, mais aussi son fleurissement. Quand je parle de société familiale je
veux dire un homme et une femme qui se vouent éternellement l’un à l’autre
avec une bande d’enfants autour d’eux.47
The literature we reviewed, and particularly that published in L’Action
nationale, supported the political ideologies of the separatist movement.
Demography was used to further its nationalist political agenda by promot-
ing the importance of raising Quebec’s fertility rate so that “the Nation”
could keep its place as a distinct culture in Canada. Until the early 1980s and
the failure of the Meech Lake accord, demographic history in Quebec not
only supported the separatist agenda but did so by promoting sentimental
myths about the “traditional” Quebec society that had become ingrained in
the collective mind.
Quebec historiography had to wait for the revisionist studies that began to
appear in the 1980s to free itself from the “tradition of dead generations
[that] weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living”. As long as the
nationalists accepted “traditional” conceptions about Quebec history,
derived from nineteenth-century cultural nationalists and modernized by the
Chicago School studies, “they anxiously conjure[d] up the spirits of the past
to their service and borrow[ed] from them names, battle cries and costumes”.
Yet it is important to note that the natalist imprecations of neither the
Church nor the nationalists seem to have been of much importance in deter-
mining how francophone women in Quebec decided to organize their fertil-
47 Jutras, “Viabilité de la famille québécoise”, p. 361.
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ity. The early-twentieth-century call for la revanche des berceaux seems to
have fallen on deaf ears; although some women did continue to have very
large families until the 1950s, many others did not. Also, when the question
of francophone birth rates became urgently pressing — in the quite different
context of below-replacement fertility in the 1960s and 1970s — the nation-
alists were again powerless to influence reproductive behaviour and the
Church was essentially irrelevant. There was thus a lack of connection
between ideology and behaviour.
This lack of connection is of real importance since it mirrors — through a
glass darkly, perhaps — the earlier situation during which it was thought that
the populationist urgings of both nationalists and clerics had been influential
in the francophone bedrooms of the province. Our line of argument suggests
that the significant minority of “modernist” women who first controlled their
fertility did so in opposition to the commands of religious or ideological
leaders; similarly, the later minority of women who did not control their fer-
tility were not responding to religious or ideological commands, nor were
they influenced by the “modern family ideal type” to which the majority of
Quebec’s families already conformed in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. In both instances, these women’s fertility histories need to be related to
“their own reasons”, and this has yet to be done by historians, some of whom
have been all too willing to accept at face value the pronouncements of cler-
ics and nationalist ideologues. Historians might consider a new direction for
research that takes seriously women’s “own reasons” when studying the
curious — indeed, unique — differentials in Quebec’s fertility history.
Revising the discourse
By the late 1980s, demographic research no longer dovetailed with the nation-
alist agenda. According to Fernand Ouellet, the historiographical concerns of
scholars were shifting from a traditional, nationalist perspective to one ori-
ented towards social history. However, the nationalist discourse as well as tra-
ditional arguments and methods have continued to appear in recent research.48
Feminist historians have helped to redirect this historiography by analysing
sources from the perspective of the women they studied and by using oral his-
tory and women’s journals and biographies to describe their lives, but the pro-
cess is far from complete.
The multidisciplinary approach of women historians to the study of Que-
bec has been vital in opening the door to the revisionist movement, whose
proponents have reviewed, and revised, previous conceptions of family his-
tory. The need to investigate the role of women became a crucial factor in
48 Fernand Ouellet, “La modernisation de l’historiographie et l’émergence de l’histoire sociale”, Recher-
ches sociographiques, vol. 26 (1985), pp. 11–83, and “La question sociale au Québec, 1880–1930 : la
condition féminine et le mouvement des femmes dans l’historiographie”, Histoire sociale/ Social His-
tory vol. 21, no. 42 (November 1988), pp. 319–345.
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the study of families.49 The revisionist focus of recent demographic research
in Quebec has emphasized declining fertility rates among francophones in
twentieth-century Quebec. This revisionist focus has, to some extent, under-
mined the belief in the veracity of the mythical, “traditional” French-Cana-
dian family, although it seems as if Quebec historians have had difficulty in
letting go of Quebecers’ perceived “otherness” or “distinctiveness” for fear
of losing their cultural identity. Furthermore, the revisionists’ arguments are
rather more concerned with demonstrating that there was substantial varia-
tion in family formation practices in Quebec’s past than with analysing its
one, truly distinctive feature in the period of demographic transition. The bi-
modal dynamics we have identified have been lost in the revisionists’ rush to
claim that Quebec’s demographic transition was like that occurring in other
modern societies. It was not, and the reason was the persistence of a signifi-
cant minority that maintained an extremely high level of reproduction for
several generations after the onset of declining fertility.
Aside from Garigue’s pioneering articles, which attracted little attention
when they appeared in the 1950s and 1960s, feminist historians were the
first to revisit the myth of the large family from the perspective of women’s
varied experiences. Marie Lavigne asked the following question in 1983:
“Pourquoi les Québécoises auraient-elles eu une histoire semblable à celles
des autres nord-américaines en ce qui concerne la vie publique et ont-elles
tant tardé à les suivre dans leur vie privée?”50 Her question was important
and, in the context of so much mythologizing about the “traditional” family
and misunderstanding about its fertility dynamics, novel. However, in trying
to answer it, Lavigne emphasized only those groups of fertility-controlling
women who had been ignored in the past by historians. Her purpose was to
highlight “other experiences”, the marginalized and perceived marginalized,
such as women who did not marry, whose children died in infancy, or who
entered a religious order.
Lavigne’s path-breaking article first reviews Henripin’s demographic
research to illustrate that not all women at the beginning of the twentieth
century produced large families. She then makes the crucial point that, while
the study of fertility and family size is — and has been in the past — done on
the basis of averages, not all women at the turn of the century were alike.
She next suggests that, if we are to understand the various facets of Quebec
families, evaluations should not be made on a global level. Lavigne notes
that many women did not bear any children; indeed, between 10 and 15 per
cent of all women, circa 1900, chose to be permanently celibate and another
10 per cent were biologically incapable of reproducing.
49 Bettina Bradbury, “Feminist Historians and Family History in Canada in the 1990s”, Journal of Fam-
ily History, vol. 25 (2000), pp. 362–383.
50 Lavigne, “Réflexions féministes autour de la fertilité québécoise”, p. 320.
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Ainsi, 25% des Québécoises des cohortes de 1887, 1903 et 1913 ne connais-
sent pas la maternité et ne contribuent pas au renouvellement de la population.
Si l’on ajoute à ce groupe celles qui ont eu un rôle reproducteur minimal (1 et
2 enfants), on a plus que 40% des Québécoises dont la vie ne correspond pas à
l’image qu’on a conservé de Québécoises prolifiques. On pourrait émettre
l’hypothèse que non seulement les femmes ont eu des expériences historiques
fort différentes, mais que parmi elles s’est opérée une division du travail de
reproduction biologique de l’espèce, le quart des femmes en étant exclues.51
To advance her argument concerning the multiplicity of life experiences of
maternity, Lavigne makes an interesting observation, which unfortunately
neither she nor other historians after her have explored. She indicates that
approximately one in five woman would produce families of 10 or more chil-
dren, thereby producing half of the children born in a given generation. Lav-
igne’s study of “other experiences” may have been undertaken to contrast
them to the large families, which were perceived to be the majority experi-
ence. Like so many of her predecessors, Lavigne seems to have assumed that
previous explanations of large families were still valid. This is hardly surpris-
ing because, even at this time, almost half of the adult population of Quebec
had been born into large families; half of all individuals had either been born
into a large family or married someone who came from a large family, thus
perpetuating the belief that most families were large. Yet, in fact, only a
minority of couples were “super-fertile”, and the majority of families fol-
lowed a pattern of reproduction and decline similar to that predicted by demo-
graphic transition theory.
In 1991 Danielle Gauvreau published a study on the multiple experiences
of women and motherhood in which she argued that about 12 per cent of mar-
ried women were sterile and therefore did not have children.52 She also
reported that “au-delà de la stérilité totale de certains couples, d’autres vivent
des situations de stérilité précoce, sont peu féconds ou, malgré leur fécondité,
ne réussissent pas à ‘réchapper’ leurs enfants. Dans tous ces cas, la taille de la
famille effective est réduite.”53 Gauvreau used Lavigne’s model to describe
the multiple fertility experiences of Quebec women: some did not marry,
some did not give birth in wedlock, not all married women produced many
children, childbearing often ended in the death of either mother or child. But
leaving aside those who chose celibacy in preference to marriage, she focused
her attention on the experience of motherhood in the context of either the use
of contraception or the reduction in the time period within which women bore
children, rather than trying to provide a more global answer to the reduction
of fertility rates over the past century.
51 Ibid., p. 326.
52 Danielle Gauvreau, “Destins de femmes, destins de mères : images et réalités historiques de la mater-
nité au Québec”, Recherches sociographiques, vol. 32 (1991), pp. 321–346.
53 Ibid., p. 326.
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Danielle Gauvreau and Peter Gossage’s article on “Canadian Fertility
Transitions” describes the modality surrounding the declining fertility rate in
Quebec at the beginning of the twentieth century.54 Their concern is to show
that the majority of Quebec mothers followed the path predicted by demo-
graphic transition theory; however, they do not address the persistence of
that minority of Quebec families which continued to produce large numbers
of children for several generations after the majority made the shift to a
modern family structure, characterized by fertility control.
The question of differential fertility experiences also has been studied in
terms of its class dimensions. In 1992 Denyse Baillargeon published her
study of the lives of married women living in a “blue collar” neighbourhood
in Montreal during the period between 1929 and 1939.55 More specifically,
she investigates the intersection of their working lives and their reproductive
experiences by focusing on certain aspects of these women’s entry into the
labour market in the context of the depression, “la crise économique”. Bail-
largeon draws attention to the role played by these working women in their
homes, with particular reference to the division of labour. The women she
interviewed had been born between 1897 and 1916, and the majority of them
grew up in families of between six and nine children. Some of the women of
the sample grew up in Montreal, while the others had either immigrated to
the city before or after their marriage. Most had little money to live on.
Although Baillargeon’s interviewees may have had similar economic
backgrounds, the number of children that each woman bore varied. Five of
the 28 fertile women interviewed (30 were interviewed in total) had more
than eight children (two of them had more than ten); six of these women had
six or seven children; eleven of them had between three and five children;
and six women had fewer than three children. These 28 women had about
129 children.56 In terms of a simple average, these fertile working mothers
had an average of 4.6 children. Baillargeon’s interviews indicate that more
than half of the women had tried to control their fertility. Baillargeon’s
results show that the reasons for doing so were varied and not always due to
financial constraints. She states, in part, “Un certain fatalisme, attribuable
tout autant à l’ignorance en matière de contraception qu’à l’intériorisation
54 Danielle Gauvreau and Peter Gossage, “Canadian Fertility Transitions: Quebec and Ontario at the
Turn of the Twentieth Century”, Journal of Family History, vol. 26 (2001), pp. 162–188.
55 Denyse Baillargeon, “La crise ordinaire : les ménagères montréalaises et la crise des années trente”,
Labour/ Le travail, vol. 30 (1992), pp. 135–162.
56 It is impossible to be more precise. We estimated that the five women with eight or more children had
an average of ten each, which yielded a total of 50; the six mothers of six or seven children were
equally divided so that their offspring totalled 39 children; the eleven women with three, four, or five
children were multiplied by four to yield 44 children; and the six with two or fewer children were
allocated, two apiece, to having none, one, and two children respectively, which yielded six children.
Baillargeon is imprecise concerning the total number of pregnancies and the number of children who
were stillborn or died in infancy (we do not know the circumstances surrounding the infertility of two
of the women interviewed), so we can arrive at only a rough approximation.
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des valeurs religieuses, l’origine rurale des conjoints et un nombre élevé
d’enfants dans leur famille d’origine constituaient autant de facteurs qui
pouvaient les amener à avoir une famille nombreuse en dépit d’une situation
économique précaire.”57 Unfortunately, Baillargeon does not develop the
point concerning the 18 per cent of the interviewed women who had more
than eight children, thereby producing 45 per cent of all children born to the
28 members of the group she studied, to embark on a discussion of the per-
sistent “super-fertility” among this minority. Nor is Baillargeon concerned to
discuss the difference in fertility rates between her poor subjects and richer,
bourgeois Montrealers; in fact, it is not clear that there was a significant dif-
ference that could be correlated with income or occupational levels.
The history of the family, next women’s history, and then feminist
approaches have proceeded in decadal waves among researchers since the
mid-1960s; prior to this time, little interest was shown to women’s perspec-
tive in history. With the women’s liberation movement, the field grew in
popularity as a means to describe women’s many forms of “enslavement” in
a male-dominated world. Radical feminist theorists were some of the first
researchers to analyse the relation between women and families character-
ized by a patriarchal organizational structure in which women have been
oppressed and alienated. Several theories followed which stemmed from
Marxist theories, often based on Engels’s theorizing. Women’s oppression
has been examined in the context of social class, and women’s relation to
families has thus been seen in the context of power relationships found in
capitalist systems. More recent feminists who have continued to espouse
Marxist theories have refined their methodology to overcome what they
have seen as lacunae in earlier approaches, in which “la socialisation de la
production ainsi que l’abolition de la propriété privée et des classes sociales
représentent des conditions nécessaires mais non suffisantes pour mettre fin
à l’oppression des femmes”.58 Although their work is determinative in many
respects for the study of family life, feminist historians have tended to pro-
vide a one-sided view of family history by setting it in an antagonistic sce-
nario. More recently, a new perspective to gender issues has emerged, partly
due to the contributions of male researchers such as Gérard Bouchard and
Peter Gossage to the study of women’s reproductive history.
Gérard Bouchard followed the publication of his book, Quelques arpents
d’Amérique, with another study that aimed to define the traditional Quebec
family in its daily life as opposed to the romanticized, ideological concept that
remained ingrained in Quebec’s collective mind. As a result of his inquiry, he
found more commonality with the rest of North America than the supposed
“otherness” or “distinctiveness” that was (and still is in some cases) part of the
57 Baillargeon, “La crise ordinaire”, p. 144.
58 Nadia Fahmy-Eid and Micheline Dumont, “Les rapports femmes/famille/éducation au Québec : bilan
de recherche”, in Fahmy-Eid and Dumont, eds., Maîtresses de maison, p. 10.
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rhetoric in Quebec nationalism.59 Recently, Bouchard proposed a slightly dif-
ferent approach to male/female relationship than the one offered by feminist
theory. Bouchard perceives women to be “dominated and exploited in their
conjugal and family lives ... these women had the power to influence but not
to decide”. Bouchard focuses on the Saguenay region between 1860 and 1930
and distinguishes between the “macrosocial” and “microsocial” spheres of
male/female relationships. He argues that, although at the macro level society
was patriarchical, at the microsocial sphere women were “able to manoeuvre,
to negotiate and to assert themselves”.60
In response to the limitations of the theory of demographic transition to
explain Quebec’s demographic history and the increasing popularity of
women’s studies, historians and social demographers have recently spent a
great deal of energy exploring women’s multiple life experiences. By high-
lighting “other experiences”, research has shown that not all families pro-
duced large numbers of children. By analysing the dynamics of family life,
using socio-economic parameters employed in demographic analyses (for
example, education level, urban/rural, occupational background, and knowl-
edge/use of contraception), researchers have found that some families fol-
lowed religious admonitions, some were influenced by the secular urgings of
nationalism, and some used contraceptive methods, while the level of educa-
tion and occupation also influenced the number of children per family.
Demographic analysis paints a picture of multiple fertility experiences,
resulting in a more — not less — confused portrait of family life in twenti-
eth-century Quebec.
Conclusion
Until quite recently the study of women and family history in Quebec was
based on an uncompromising view of the province’s large, religious centres
of tradition. Furthermore, it has become evident that during, if not before,
the Quiet Revolution of the mid-twentieth century the Catholic Church had
lost its hold over the population. Historians have struggled with an ingrained
perception of what constituted the “traditional” Quebec family history at the
beginning of the twentieth century. Early studies on the demographic history
of Quebec portrayed women as generators of large families, a practice pre-
scribed by the political elite and the Church. Popular attachment to what was
59 Gérard Bouchard, “L’histoire sociale au Québec : réflexions sur quelques paradoxes”, Revue d’his-
toire de l’Amérique française, vol. 51 (1997), pp. 243–269, and “Marginality, Co-interation and
Change: Social History as a Critical Exercise”, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, vol. 8
(1997), pp. 19–38.
60 Gérard Bouchard, “Through the Meshes of Patriarchy: The Male/Female Relationship in the Saguenay
Peasant Society (1860–1930)”, History of the Family, vol. 4 (1999), pp. 399, 397. The same argument
is advanced in a French version of this essay: “La sexualité comme pratique et rapport social chez les
paysans du Saguenay (1860–1930)”, Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française, vol. 54 (2001),
pp. 183–217.
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defined a posteriori as the “traditional” Quebec family seems to have been
rooted in the fear that losing its “otherness” would render Quebec culture a
lesser portion of Canada’s history and thereby threaten the loss of both its
cultural identity and its political clout.
The new social history — and most especially, the recent generation of
feminist-inspired historians — has revisited and criticized the myth of the
large family and, most especially, the monolithic view of Quebec families
that has been an influential part of the collective consciousness. There is a
peculiar double-sidedness to these revisionist studies. On one hand, accord-
ing to studies of Quebecers’ aggregated fertility, francophone families
continued to produce significantly more children than their English-speak-
ing counterparts well into the twentieth century, despite a longstanding
experience of industrialization, urbanization, and contraception — the so-
called hallmarks of modernization. Yet, on the other hand, all studies of
demographic statistics make it abundantly clear that, even before the onset
of declining fertility in the late nineteenth century, there were not only
widely differing inter-generational experiences in family size but also sub-
stantial differences in intra-generational families in terms of the number of
children.
To a certain extent, the recent, revisionist focus on the multiplicity of fer-
tility experiences has been valuable in that it has broken apart the myth of
the “traditional family”. But revisionism seems to have gone too far. The
real distinctiveness of Quebec’s fertility decline has been lost in the process.
Historians and demographers need to revisit the family experiences of those
who continued to produce large families and of those who lived in them to
determine not only that this minority persisted in practising la sur-fécondité
but also why, after the mid-twentieth century, so few of their offspring chose
to maintain this pattern of reproduction.
Everyone living in Quebec (or Canada, for that matter) knows an anec-
dotal story concerning a Quebec friend (or a friend’s friend) who was one of
a large sibling group but who has only one child. Indeed, until very recently
about one-half of all francophone Quebecers would have been born into
these very large families. The crucial element of truth in this anecdote has
been lost, however, in the current fascination with explicating the post-mod-
ern concern with multiple life experiences without accommodating the
“super-fertile” sub-group in these studies.
An important step in revisiting the current perspective of family life
would be to refocus our attention on Quebec’s peculiar, persistent minority
of very large families and to ask two basic questions:
1. Why did you choose to have so many children when families around you
chose to limit their family size?
2. In what ways were your experiences of la sur-fécondité influential in your
decision to break with this pattern?
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To be more precise: why were “super-fertile” families so prolific? Why did
this “super-fertile” minority not follow the transitional demographic patterns
as did the majority of other families? And why, in the 1960s, did the children
of these “super-fertile families” not continue to reproduce as had their par-
ents and grandparents?
The persistence of “super-fertility” in twentieth-century Quebec was
therefore anomalous. Its almost-overnight disappearance is the riddle
wrapped in the mystery of its persistence, inside the larger enigma of declin-
ing fertility.
